Interpreting ‘Bhagwa’: Arbitrary Application of UP Govt Servant Conduct Rules

Can the uttar pradesh government claim a monopoly over a color? Is the term 'Bhagwa', a symbol of ancient renunciation and cultural heritage now legally synonymous with the State? These haunting questions that lead us to a crossroads where the spirit of justice has been sacrificed at the altar of linguistic speculation and administrative overreach. This case study details an inquiry where mandatory due process was discarded in favor of an arbitrary "flawed syllogism."

Perhaps most distressing is the shift in the hallowed halls of the Uttar Pradesh Public Service Tribunal. Instead of asking if the law was followed, the inquiry, instead, posed the question: What is a woman of rank allowed to say? When judges prioritize an officer's "moral mandate" over the "flawed nature" of a state’ government’s prosecution, the very foundation of constitutional morality begins to crumble.

On February 2, 2018,  a local media outlet Hindustan News reported about a social media interaction by Rashmi Varun (Deputy Director of the Economics and Statistics Division in Saharanpur, Uttar Pradesh). The publication highlighted a Facebook comment made by the officer concerning an Ambedkar rally in Kasganj. Notably, this post was private in nature, garnering minimal engagement with only six or seven views and likes. Yet it was subsequently leveraged as the basis for disciplinary action. The details of the post are herein as under:

Under mounting duress from departmental authorities, the officer was compelled to post an apology on Facebook on February 2, 2018. This is what she wrote: 

The Hindustan News further publicized the matter on February 4, 2018, effectively keeping the controversy in the public eye despite the officer's attempt to de-escalate the situation.

Following the first publication in Hindustan News, the District Magistrate (acting as In-charge Commissioner) issued a Show Cause Notice on February 3, 2018. The petitioner submitted a prompt and comprehensive reply on February 4, 2018. However, by February 5, 2018, the Commissioner summarily passed an order holding her guilty of violating the UP Government Servant Conduct Rules, 1956.

Consequently, a formal warning was issued, and the petitioner was immediately transferred and attached to the Headquarters Division. The stated justification for these punitive measures was that her social media activity was 'indirectly critical of the government,' despite the lack of a detailed inquiry or evidence of actual misconduct. According to the Government Order published by Uttar Pradesh on September 27, 2019 (at para 7(6)), if an opportunity has been given and a warning has been issued, five marks are to be deducted in assessment for promotion, and under Clause 7 such adverse material is to be considered by the Departmental Promotion Committee.

Despite the initial punishment  of warning remaining in force, a formal chargesheet was issued against the petitioner on February 28, 2018, based on the same Facebook post. This second proceeding constitutes a clear violation of the principle of double jeopardy, as prohibited under the State Government Order of April 22, 2015 and protected under Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India.

In her response to the chargesheet on March 21, 2018, the petitioner categorically denied the allegations, asserting that the post lacked any malicious intent and had been irrationally sensationalized by local media. She further raised the vital preliminary objection that she had already been penalized for the same alleged misconduct by punishment of warning on February 5, 2018.

Notably, this post was private in nature, garnering minimal engagement with only six or seven views and likes. 

Despite this, the Inquiry Officer concluded that the post constituted an 'indirect criticism' of the Government’s law and order, remarkably reaching this verdict without a single shred of cogent proof or supporting material. The entire inquiry was conducted in total defiance of the U.P. Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999. Fundamental procedural safeguards were abandoned: no date, time, or place for the inquiry was ever fixed; no personal hearing was granted; and no witnesses or documentary evidence were produced or tested. Notably, the petitioner had no role in the newspaper’s decision to publish her private comments.

Following the submission of the inquiry report on April 12, 2018, a Show Cause Notice was issued on May 9, 2018. The petitioner responded with a comprehensive representation on June 7 that same year, categorically denying all charges and highlighting the procedural irregularities.

Despite this rigorous defense, the Disciplinary Authority issued a major penalty order on November 6, 2019, permanently withholding two increments and recording a censure entry. This order stands in direct violation of Rule 9(4) of the 1999 Rules The Authority failed to consider the petitioner’s defense and issued a 'non-speaking order' devoid of reasoning. In the eyes of the law, an administrative order that ignores a delinquent employee's explanation and fails to provide specific reasons is fundamentally flawed and unsustainable.

But before we proceed, let us break down The U.P. Government Servant's Conduct Rules, 1956. Of particular interest is Rule 7:

A contextual reading of Rule 7 and its accompanying illustrations reveals no explicit prohibition against private social media expressions. The Inquiry Officer’s conclusion, that the petitioner was critical of the Government, relies on a flawed syllogism: it requires an arbitrary interpretation where the term 'Bhagwa' (Saffron) is synonymous with 'The Government.' In the absence of any official departmental recognition equating a specific color with the State, such a conclusion is legally unfounded. Further, 'Bhagwa' is a term of profound cultural and spiritual significance in the Indian subcontinent, symbolizing renunciation and purity. To reduce it to a political signifier without evidence is both reductive and irrational. Without cogent proof of intent, the conclusion remains a product of administrative bewilderment rather than a factual finding.

During the proceedings before the learned Tribunal, the litigation was marked by frequent adjournments and a series of subjective, morally-charged inquiries from the Bench. The focus often drifted from the legality of the disciplinary order to the officer's personal choice of expression. The Honorable Judges questioned why a Class-I officer would author such comments, suggesting that her writing should instead be confined to 'acceptable' social issues such as women’s rights or the prevention of sexual harassment at the workplace.

Parallelly, the Government Counsel persistently urged the Tribunal to direct the registration of an FIR against the petitioner, characterizing her private expression as a 'foolish' act inconsistent with her official duties. This line of questioning and the State’s aggressive stance indicate a departure from the core legal issue – whether the disciplinary procedure was valid? Instead, the proceedings created a climate of moral judgment that overshadowed the constitutional protections of free speech and procedural due process.

While a discussion on the broad ambit of Article 19(1)(a) may seem redundant, it is critical to note that the petitioner’s actions do not fall within any of the 'reasonable restrictions' enumerated under Article 19(2). Even under the strictest scrutiny, a private social media post shared with a negligible audience cannot be construed as a threat to public order, decency, or the sovereignty of the State.

The courts time and again have given warnings around the interpretation of Article 19 and most recently, The Supreme Court in Imran Pratapgarhi v. State of Gujarat (2025) underscored the duty of Courts to protect freedom of speech:

“Sometimes, we, the Judges, may not like spoken or written words. But, still, it is our duty to uphold the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a). If the police or executive fail to honour and protect the fundamental rights… it is the duty of the Courts to step in.”

In Shrimati Lipika Paul v. State of Tripura (2021), the High Court of Tripura had observed:

“Nothing contained in the said post suggests canvassing for or against any political party. It only expresses certain beliefs of the petitioner in general terms. As a Government servant the petitioner is not devoid of her right of free speech, a fundamental right which can be curtailed only by a valid law.”

The Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, in Amar Singh v. State of U.P. (2025) has also applied similar reasoning.The mere status of being a 'public servant' does not create a blanket waiver of fundamental rights. For an expression to transition from a 'private opinion' to 'professional misconduct,' there must be a direct, demonstrable nexus between the speech and a resulting dereliction of duty. In the absence of such a nexus, the State’s attempt to punish the petitioner is not a regulation of conduct, but an unconstitutional overreach that fails both the constitutional test of Article 19 and the statutory test of the Conduct Rules.

In its judgment delivered on December 8, 2025, in Claim Petition No. 338 of 2021 (Smt. Rashmi v. State of U.P. & Another), the learned Tribunal set aside the major penalty of November 6, 2019, yet conspicuously failed to recognise the initial warning of February 5, 2018 as punishment at all, leaving the question of double jeopardy hanging and unanswered altogether. 

More significantly, the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by affirmatively directing the State to impose a 'minor punishment' within three months. As a forum for judicial review, the Tribunal's mandate is limited to evaluating the legality of the administrative process. However by prescribing a specific category of punishment, it usurped the exclusive prerogative of the Disciplinary Authority, thereby violating the established boundaries of administrative law (as noted in decisions of the Supreme Court such as Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Rajendra Singh (2013) and State of Uttar Pradesh v. Nand Kishore Shukla (1996). The Tribunal’s judgment effectively operates as a back-door admission of the State’s claim: that the term ‘Bhagwa’ is synonymous with the Indian government.

The views are personal.

Courtesy: The Leaflet