Lebanon’s Growing Volatility Amid Israel’s Ambition May Lead to Large-Scale Civil War

It is surprising to see how little coverage Lebanon is getting, even in India’s independent media. While most attention is on Gaza and the atrocities committed by Israel, Lebanon seems to be on the edge of a civil war and presents an opportunity for Tel Aviv to take more land in the north.

After the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, Tel Aviv, along with Palestine, turned its focus toward Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and Iran. Gaza became the centre-stage, but other places also played a big role in shifting global attention, often in unexpected ways.

Think of it this way. When Australia broke away from the United States by calling for an end to Israel’s unlawful presence in Palestinian territories, and Amnesty International said Israel was committing genocide, something major happened almost at the same time. On December 8, a man with a $10 million bounty on his head, Al Jolani, rose to power by removing Bashar al Assad in Syria. This was one of the most dramatic moments in West Asia in recent years.  

The world’s attention shifted from Palestine to Syria. After Al Jolani, Ahmed Al-Shara took power, Israel’s occupation extended to Madinat al Salam, Khan Arnabah, Maariya, Al Wehda Dam, Quneitra and the Syrian-controlled Mount Hermon. Don’t forget, this happened while daily killings in Palestine continued.

Since Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced his plan to occupy Gaza, events have been unfolding at a dramatic pace. Netanyahu’s public complaint about losing the propaganda war on social media, the killing of an entire Al Jazeera crew, and Us President Donald Trump’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska have all dominated global headlines. Yet, serious concern lies with Lebanon, and why this fragile, fractured nation is not getting the attention it deserves.

After a cabinet meeting at the Grand Serail on August 7, 2025, in Beirut, and the government’s announcement of disarming Hezbollah before the end of the year following a proposal by U.S. envoy Tom Barrack, protests in support of the group, including the blocking of the airport road, broke out. However, Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, Naim Qassem, made the party’s stance clear, stating that “the issue of weapons is a matter of national principle, one that can only be resolved through national consensus, similar to constitutional amendments.”

Let us draw a parallel:  The Irish Republican Army’s (IRA) disarmament under the Good Friday Agreement, also known as the Belfast Agreement signed in April 1998, offers, to some extent, a model of how such a process can be managed. This explains why it is not possible for a US and Israel-backed government to disarm the Lebanese group and why such an attempt would surely push the country into a Syria-like situation.

At the heart of Hezbollah’s arms debate is the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, passed in the aftermath of the 2006 war. It calls for the group’s disarmament and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Lebanese land, with no armed forces other than UNIFIL and the Lebanese military south of the Litani River, which flows about 29 kilometres north of the border. While the resolution was intended to create a framework for peace, the geopolitical environment in Lebanon is far more complex than it was in Northern Ireland during the IRA’s disarmament.

In Northern Ireland, disarmament took place within a political framework that addressed core grievances, integrated former combatants into political life, and relied on strong enforcement mechanisms through the UK and Irish governments.

Lebanon lacks these elements. The state’s political system is fractured along sectarian lines, weakened by economic collapse and the involvement of foreign powers, particularly Israel. The Belfast Agreement worked because it was comprehensive. The IRA gave up its weapons in return for political legitimacy, prisoner releases, constitutional changes, and security reforms. The trust was imperfect, but both sides had binding commitments backed by powerful guarantors.

Lack of genuine political will, shaped significantly by US and Israeli influence, has distorted the government’s priorities. The conversation is almost entirely centred on Hezbollah’s disarmament, while broader conditions, such as Israel’s continued cross-border operations and airstrikes, which are essential to address for a comprehensive political settlement, have been largely ignored.

Any unilateral disarmament without guarantees of protection from the state or the international community would leave Hezbollah exposed to a far superior Israeli military. This reality is not lost on Hezbollah’s supporters, who see the group as the only effective deterrent against Israeli military action.

Lebanese Minister of Labour, Mohammad Haidar, responding to US envoy Barrack’s proposal, said, “As someone who is part of the people, how can I look a martyr’s mother in the eye or a young man consumed by existential fear and tell them they must surrender the only protection they have?”

Israel’s intention to occupy territories, as seen in Syria, is keeping the Lebanese state in a near permanent state of confrontation with Hezbollah. The Lebanese Armed Forces, already underfunded and politically constrained, cannot realistically take over Hezbollah’s military role overnight.

The most dangerous outcome, therefore, is a large-scale civil war with a slow burning conflict marked by targeted killings, militia clashes, and proxy battles. In such a climate, Lebanon’s already fragile economy would collapse further, and its governance structures would erode. Disarming the resistance without a political and security framework could leave the country fractured and dominated by multiple militias.

If Beirut is to avoid this fate, any disarmament process must meet several conditions. First, it must be part of a comprehensive national political agreement that includes all major factions, addresses the core grievances of Hezbollah’s constituency, and redefines Lebanon’s security doctrine in a way that assures protection from Israeli threats.

In such a situation, the international community must recognise that pressure alone will not lead Hezbollah to disarm. The Houthis and Hezbollah are Shia forces whose history and creed leave no room for surrender but to resist. Houthi refusal to disarm has prolonged Yemen’s suffering, yet it has also ensured they remain central to any negotiation. Hezbollah may calculate that the risks of disarming outweigh the potential benefits, especially given the lack of trust in both domestic institutions and international guarantees.

Second, the process must have credible international guarantees, not just UN resolutions, but binding commitments from influential powers willing to enforce them.

Third, the Lebanese Armed Forces must be strengthened significantly, both in resources and political independence, to take over the role of defending the country’s borders and sovereignty.

As the world focuses on Palestine and other crises, we must also watch this Mediterranean nation. In times of chaos, Tel Aviv may seize the chance to claim more Lebanese land.

The writer is a Delhi-based independent researcher, performing artist who often blogs on geopolitical issues. The views are personal.